We investigate to what extent finitely additive probability measures on the unit interval are determined by their moment sequence. We do this by studying the lower envelope of all finitely additive probability measures with a given moment sequence. Our investigation leads to several elegant expressions for this lower envelope, and it allows us to conclude that the information provided by the moments is equivalent to the one given by the associated lower and upper distribution functions.
INTRODUCTION
To what extent does a sequence of moments determine a probability measure? This problem has a well-known answer when we are talking about probability measures that are σ -additive. We believe the corresponding problem for probability measures that are only finitely additive has received much less attention. This paper tries to remedy that situation somewhat by studying the particular case of finitely additive probability measures on the real unit interval [0, 1] (or equivalently, after an appropriate transformation, on any compact real interval).
The question refers to the moment problem. Classically, there are three of these: the Hamburger moment problem for probability measures on R; the Stieltjes moment problem for probability measures on [0, +∞); and the Hausdorff moment problem for probability measures on compact real intervals, which is the one we consider here.
Let us first look at the moment problem for σ -additive probability measures. Consider a sequence m of real numbers m k , k ≥ 0. It turns out (see, for instance, [13, Section VII.3] for an excellent exposition) that there then is a σ -additive probability measure P σ m defined on the Borel sets of [0, 1] such that [0, 1] x k dP σ m = m k , k ≥ 0, if and only if m 0 = 1 (normalisation) and the sequence m is completely monotone. This means that for all n, k ≥ 0 (−1) n ∆ n m k ≥ 0, where the differences ∆ n m k are defined recursively through ∆ n m k = ∆ n−1 m k+1 − ∆ n−1 m k for n ≥ 1 and ∆ 0 m k = m k . The crucial step towards the proof of this important result was taken by Hausdorff [14; 15] . We shall call this necessary and sufficient condition on the moment sequence the Hausdorff moment condition, and any moment sequence that satisfies it a Hausdorff moment sequence. The existence of a σ -additive probability measure P σ m with a given sequence of moments m implies its uniqueness, by virtue of the F. Riesz Representation Theorem.
When we let go of σ -additivity, uniqueness is no longer guaranteed. In general, there will be an infinite (closed and convex) set M (m) of finitely additive probabilities that correspond to a given Hausdorff moment sequence m. One of the objectives of this paper is to study this set more closely. We shall see that it is very convenient to do so using the mathematical machinery behind Walley's [24] theory of coherent lower previsions, for which we introduce the basics in Section 2.
In Section 3 we formulate the problem under study using the language of coherent lower previsions. The fundamental step we take, is not to consider the finitely additive probabilities in M (m) themselves, but to study their lower envelope E m , which generally turns out to be a non-linear (but super-additive, normed, positive and positively homogeneous) real functional on the set L ([0, 1]) of all bounded functions on [0, 1] . A functional with these properties is called a coherent lower prevision in Walley's theory. We show that, perhaps surprisingly, this functional is σ -additive on the lattice of open sets (see Propositions 9 and 10).
The decision to study E m , rather than the elements of M (m), may seem to lead us away from the actual problem at hand, but that is only an illusion. Indeed, by their very nature, and contrary to the sigma-additive case, finitely additive probabilities on an infinite set that extend 'something' are usually inconstructibles, meaning that they cannot actually be constructed, but that their existence may be inferred from the Hahn-Banach Theorem (or even stronger, the Axiom of Choice); see [22] for more details. It was one of Walley's achievements to show that we can efficiently and constructively deal with them not by looking at the members of M (m) individually, but by working with their lower envelope, which in his language is called the natural extension of the 'something' they extend.
2 Not only can this lower envelope always be constructed explicitly, but it is the closest we can get in a constructive manner to the finitely additive probabilities themselves. In the present case, we shall see that a finitely additive probability has the moment sequence m if and only if it dominates E m on all (indicators of) events. In this precise sense, the natural extension E m of the moment sequence m completely determines the solution to the Hausdorff moment problem for finitely additive probabilities. Much of what we shall do in this paper is to give useful formulae and methods for calculating E m .
Why do we devote so much attention to a problem that may appear perhaps, to some readers, to be of limited and only technical interest? First of all, the problem is more general than its formulation in terms of moments may seem to suggest: what we do here, is to infer as much as we can in a 'constructive' manner about all the positive linear functionals that extend a given positive linear functional defined on the set C ([0, 1]) of all continuous real functions on a compact real interval [0, 1] . Obviously, this is because specifying a Hausdorff moment sequence is equivalent to specifying a positive linear functional on C ([0, 1]) (also see Theorem 1, normalisation obviously isn't an issue here). By appropriate transformations, these results can even be extended from [0, 1] to arbitrary compact real intervals.
Secondly, when extending linear functionals to larger domains, it is current practice in many mathematical fields (and most notably in probability and measure theory) to restrict attention to those domains where the functional still has a unique linear extension, or in other words, to concentrate on linear functionals only. While this attitude may have perfectly respectable historical antecedents, we want to show here, by working out the details in a number of specific examples, that it is unfortunate and perhaps even unproductive, because it tends to hide very interesting mathematical structure that quite often becomes apparent only when leaving the linear ambit. Let us mention two examples that are explained in much more detail further on.
In integration theory, it is quite common to define an integral by first looking at lower and upper integrals, and then to conveniently forget about them by zooming in on integrable functions. These are the functions for which the lower and upper integral coincide, and for which an integral can therefore be uniquely defined. Often, it is only this integral that is considered to be of any interest or even to have any meaning, and much effort is then devoted to studying its properties. But, as we have argued in general in earlier papers [6; 8] , the lower and upper integrals are of considerable interest in themselves as well. They quite often have mathematical properties that are worthy of consideration per se, but which in addition allow us to derive results about integrals and integrability in a straightforward manner. This is often much harder to do when limiting the attention to integrals alone.
Another case in point are the linear extensions of a Hausdorff moment sequence m. We know that these are not unique, so following standard practice, we could restrict our attention to the set of m-integrable bounded functions, i.e., those bounded functions on which all linear extensions of the moment sequence coincide. We could then study the properties of the resulting linear functional E m on this set. Instead, what we do further on, is to study the non-linear functional E m , for which we can show easily that it is completely monotone (see Theorem 13) . It can therefore be written as a Choquet functional (and ultimately as a Riemann integral). This allows us find simple and elegant expressions for E m (Theorems 13 and 14). It also allows us to characterise in a straightforward manner those bounded functions that are m-integrable (Theorem 13). We believe this would have been much harder to do by limiting our attention to the linear restriction E m of E m alone.
A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO COHERENT LOWER PREVISIONS
Let us give a short introduction to those concepts from the theory of coherent lower previsions that we shall use in this paper. We refer to Walley's book [24] for their behavioural interpretation, and for a much more complete introduction and treatment.
Consider a non-empty set Ω. Then a gamble on Ω is a bounded real-valued function on Ω. We denote the set of all gambles on Ω by L (Ω).
A lower prevision P is a real-valued map defined on some subset K of L (Ω). If the domain K of P only contains indicators I A of events A, then P is also called a lower probability. We also write P(I A ) as P(A), the lower probability of the event A. The conjugate upper prevision P of P is defined on −K by P( f ) := −P(− f ) for every − f in K . If the domain of P contains indicators only, then P is also called an upper probability.
A lower prevision P defined on the set L (Ω) of all gambles is called coherent if it is super-additive: P( f + g) ≥ P( f ) + P(g), positively homogeneous: P(λ f ) = λ P( f ) for all λ ≥ 0, and positive: P( f ) ≥ inf f ; here f and g are any gambles on Ω. A lower prevision P on an arbitrary domain K is then called coherent if it can be extended to some coherent lower prevision on all gambles. This is the case if and only if
for any n, m ≥ 0 and f 0 , f 1 , . . . , f n in K . A coherent lower prevision is monotone: f ≤ g ⇒ P( f ) ≤ P(g), and uniformly continuous: if a sequence of gambles f n , n ≥ 0 converges uniformly to another gamble f , then P( f n ) → P( f ).
A linear prevision P on L (Ω) is a coherent lower prevision that is moreover selfconjugate: P(− f ) = −P( f ). In other words, a linear prevision is a positive and normalised (P(1) = 1) linear functional (we also use 1 as the constant function with value 1). A functional defined on an arbitrary subset K of L (Ω) is called a linear prevision if it can be extended to a linear prevision on L (Ω). This is the case if and only if sup[
for any n, m ≥ 0 and f 1 , . . . , f n , g 1 , . . . , g m in K . We let P(Ω) denote the set of all linear previsions on L (Ω).
The restriction Q of a linear prevision P on L (Ω) to the set ℘(Ω) of all events is a finitely additive probability (also called a probability charge). Linear previsions are completely determined by the values they assume on events; they are simply expectations with respect to finitely additive probabilities. This can be expressed using a Dunford integral (see, for instance, [1] ): for any gamble h in L (Ω) we have P(h) = (D) h dQ.
The natural extension E P to L (Ω) of a coherent lower prevision P defined on K , is the point-wise smallest coherent lower prevision that extends P to all gambles. It is equal to the lower envelope of the set M (P) of all linear previsions that point-wise dominate P on its domain K : for any gamble f in L (Ω)
Moreover, M (E P ) = M (P). Indeed, if P is a coherent lower prevision on L (Ω) and P is its conjugate upper prevision, then for any gamble f and for any a ∈ [P( f ), P( f )] there is a linear prevision P ∈ M (P) such that P( f ) = a.
The procedure of natural extension is transitive: if we consider E 1 the point-wise smallest coherent lower prevision on some domain K 1 ⊇ K that dominates P on K (i.e., the natural extension of P to K 1 ) and then the natural extension E 2 of E 1 to all gambles, then E 2 is also the natural extension of P to L (Ω). Moreover, M (E 2 ) = M (E 1 ) = M (P). In particular, if P is a linear prevision on a negation invariant domain K that has a unique extension P 1 to some larger negation invariant domain K 1 , then a linear prevision on all gambles will dominate (agree with) P on K if and only if it dominates (agrees with) P 1 on K 1 .
Next, we turn to the notion of n-monotonicity. A thorough study of the properties of n-monotone coherent lower previsions can be found in earlier papers [5; 6; 7] . A lower prevision defined on a lattice K of gambles (a set of gambles closed under pointwise minima ∧ and maxima ∨) is called n-monotone if, for all 1 ≤ p ≤ n, and all f ,
A lower prevision is completely monotone when it is n-monotone for any n ≥ 1. This is for instance the case for linear previsions. We can easily characterise the natural extension of a completely monotone coherent lower prevision P. If it is defined on a lattice of events A that includes / 0 and Ω, its natural extension to all events is again completely monotone, and coincides with its inner set function P * , where
Moreover, given a completely monotone coherent lower prevision P defined on a linear lattice of gambles K that contains all constant gambles, its natural extension E to all gambles coincides with its inner extension P * , where
and E is again completely monotone.
A completely monotone coherent lower prevision P on all gambles satisfies a number of interesting properties. First, it is comonotone additive: we have P( f + g) = P( f ) + P(g) for any two gambles f and g that are comonotone, meaning that if f (ω) < f (ϖ) then also g(ω) ≤ g(ϖ) for all ω and ϖ in Ω. Secondly, it is completely determined by the values it assumes on events: it is actually equal to the Choquet functional associated with the set function (a completely monotone coherent lower probability) that is the restriction of P to events. And thirdly, the class of P-integrable gambles, that is, those gambles h satisfying P(h) = P(h) is a uniformly closed linear lattice that contains all constant gambles. In particular, the class of P-integrable events is a field. Interestingly, a gamble h is P-integrable if and only if its cut sets { f ≥ t} := {x ∈ [0, 1] : f (x) ≥ t} are P-integrable for all but a countable number of t. 
where p k (x) = x k for all x ∈ [0, 1] and k ≥ 0. We define a functional P m on this set by letting P m (p k ) := m k for k ≥ 0. This functional can be uniquely extended to a linear functionalP m on the set V ([0, 1]) of all polynomials. This is done as follows:
for all n ≥ 0 and a k ∈ R. We can then ask whether there is some finitely additive probability, or equivalently, some linear prevision Q with moment sequence m, i.e., such that Q(p k ) = m k = P m (p k ) for all k ≥ 0. This Q would extend the functional P m (or equivalently, the functionalP m ) to the set
The following theorem provides an answer to this question by summarising a number of results from the literature. We give the proof, which is quite simple, in order to make the paper more self-contained. Proof. A real functional on some domain is a linear prevision if and only if it can be extended to a linear prevision on all gambles. By also observing the following, we see at once that the first three statements are equivalent. Let Q be any extension of P m to a linear prevision on all gambles on
. By virtue of the Stone-Weierstraß Theorem, every continuous function h on [0, 1] is a uniform limit of some sequence of polynomials p n on [0, 1]. Then, since any linear prevision Q on L ([0, 1]) is in particular uniformly continuous, we see that Q(h) = lim n→∞ Q(p n ) = lim n→∞Pm (p n ), 3 We shall always assume that [0, 1] is endowed with the Euclidean topology, i.e., with the relativisation to [0, 1] of the Euclidean topology on the set of real numbers R.
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where the last equality follows from the previously established fact that Q andP m must coincide on polynomials. This shows that (i) the value of Q(h) must be independent of the actual choice of the sequence p n → h, and (ii) that all Q have the same value on h.
We now give a circular proof for the equivalence of these statements with the rest. To see that the third statement implies the fourth, recall thatP m is a linear prevision on V ([0, 1]), and therefore satisfies min p ≤P m (p) ≤ max p for any p in V ([0, 1]). We see at once that the fourth statement implies the fifth. We now prove that the fifth statement implies the sixth. We already know that m 0 = 1, so consider, for any non-negative integers k and n, the non-
n x k+ and therefore the assumption implies that ∑ n =0 (−1) n m k+ =P m (q) ≥ 0. Now observe that the left-hand side of the above equality is equal to (−1) n ∆ n m k . We complete the proof by showing that the last statement implies the third. Recall thatP m is the only linear functional that extends
. So in order to prove that P m is a linear prevision, it remains to show thatP m satisfiesP m (p) ≥ min p for all polynomials
+ min p so we only have to prove thatP m is positive. 4 Consider any non-negative polynomial p, and the associated Bernstein polynomial B n,p of degree n, given by B n,
. Using a general reciprocity relation involving differences (see Feller's book [13, Section VII.1, Eq. (1.8)]), we can write
From this, we can deduce that
and consequentlyP . Since by assumption,P m assumes a non-negative value on these basis polynomials (see above), it follows by linearity thatP m assumes a non-negative value on all non-negative polynomials. Now, using Equation (1) we can prove that for 0
It is trivial that if there exists a σ -additive probability P σ m with a given sequence of moments m, there is also a linear prevision with these moments, because P σ m has a linear extension to all gambles. Interestingly, this proposition tells us that the converse is also true: the Hausdorff moment problem has a solution (as a linear prevision) if and only if the Hausdorff moment condition is satisfied.
Let us assume from now on that the moment sequence m satisfies the Hausdorff 
In this expression, the first integral is the Lebesgue integral associated with the probability measure P σ m , and the second integral the Lebesgue-Stieltjes integral associated with the distribution function
, and the expectation operator E σ m , as well as both integrals are actually defined for all Borel-measurable functions
In this sense, the moments determine a unique σ -additive probability measure on the Borel sets. But the solution is not as clear-cut if we look for the finitely additive probabilities on all events, or, equivalently, the linear previsions on all gambles, that correspond to the given moments. These are given by the set
of all linear previsions Q that dominate, or equivalently, coincide with,P m on continuous gambles.
For any gamble h on [0, 1], it follows that the linear previsions that solve the moment problem can (and will) assume any value in the real interval [E m (h), E m (h)], where
is called the natural extension ofP m , or, because of the transitivity of natural extension, of P m . We shall also call it the natural extension of the moment sequence m. It is the point-wise smallest coherent lower prevision that coincides withP m on C ([0, 1]), or equivalently that coincides with P m on V p ([0, 1]). The functional E m is its conjugate upper prevision and satisfies
By definition, E m is the smallest coherent lower prevision for which
, that has (precise) moment sequence m, and a linear prevision dominates E m if and only if it dominates, and therefore coincides with,P m (or P m ). In other words, we get
So we see that the coherent lower prevision E m completely determines the solution to the Hausdorff moment problem for linear previsions: a linear prevision P has a sequence of moments m if and only if it dominates E m .
In particular, the gambles h on [0, 1] where the lower and upper natural extensions coincide, i.e., for which E m (h) = E m (h), are precisely those gambles to which P m has a unique extension as a linear prevision. We shall call such gambles m-integrable. One of the 8 ENRIQUE MIRANDA, GERT DE COOMAN, AND ERIK QUAEGHEBEUR goals in this paper is to study these m-integrable gambles. Another, closely related, goal is to study the functional E m .
In particular, we can associate with E m and its conjugate E m a lower distribution function F m and an upper distribution function F m on [0, 1], given by
for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Then we can ask ourselves: what are the properties of these functions, what is their relationship to F σ m , and to what extent do they determine the functional E m ? We answer these questions in the following section.
In order to be able to place the discussion of later sections in the right perspective, it is useful, at this point, to make a small historical digression, and to try and reconstruct exactly how Hausdorff and F. Riesz contributed to the solution of what we now call the Hausdorff moment problem. In a famous series of papers [14; 15] can be represented as a Riemann-Stieltjes integral (RS) Since it is a property of Riemann-Stieltjes integrals that an identity such as Equation (2) determines α uniquely, except in its points of discontinuity, 7 we see that there will be a unique right-continuous (distribution function) α that corresponds to a given Hausdorff moment sequence m, and this unique α can be used to construct the unique σ -additive probability measure with moment sequence m, using standard measure-theoretic methods. But we already observe at this point that there will usually be an infinity of distribution functions α that are not right-continuous and still generateP m , and that the RiemannStieltjes integral somehow will have an important part in describing the finitely additive probabilities with a given moment sequence. Indeed, with each solution α of Equation (2) there will correspond an extension ofP m as a linear prevision on the set of all gambles that are Riemann-Stieltjes integrable with respect to α. But this set of integrable gambles will usually only be a proper subset of L ([0, 1]), and we want to look at extensions of the 6 Actually, Riesz proved his Representation Theorem for continuous linear functionals L and functions α of bounded variation, which can generally be written as a differences of two non-decreasing functions. Similarly, Hausdorff proved his result for what he calls a "C-Folge", which is the difference of completely monotone sequences, and functions α of bounded variation. Our formulation here is equivalent.
7 And up to an additive (integration) constant, which is fixed here because of the normalisation constraints moment sequence to all gambles. That is why we do not take up the subject of RiemannStieltjes integrals and distribution functions here, 8 but take a completely different route.
THE NATURAL EXTENSION
We use these expressions to prove a number of interesting properties of E m and E m , and the lower and upper distribution functions F m and F m . We collect these properties in Propositions 3 through 11.
4.1. Basic properties of E m , F m and F m .
Proposition 3. Consider a Hausdorff moment sequence m. Then the following statements hold. Proof. The inequality holds trivially for x = 1, so let us any consider x ∈ [0, 1). Let 0 < ε < 1 − x, and define the gamble f ε on [0, 1] by
This is a continuous gamble satisfying f ε > I [0,x] and f ε − ε < I [0,x+ε] . Hence, it follows from Equation (3) and the fact thatP m is a linear prevision on
If we now let ε → 0, we obtain the desired inequality. The second part follows from the definition of D m and Proposition 3.
Proposition 5. Consider a Hausdorff moment sequence m. Then the following statements hold.
For any x
The following statements are equivalent for all x ∈ (0, 1):
Proof. Let us begin with the first statement. Consider x ∈ [0, 1]. By virtue of Proposition 3 and Lemma 4, it suffices to prove that F m (x) = F m (x+). The equality holds by definition for x = 1. Consider then x ∈ [0, 1). Then by Equation (3), for any ε > 0 there is some continuous gamble h ε ≥ I [0,x] such thatP m (h ε ) < F m (x) + ε. Given η > 0, we have h ε (x) + η ≥ 1 + η, so by continuity of h ε there is some 0 < δ εη < 1 − x such that h ε (t) + η ≥ 1 for all x ≤ t ≤ x + δ εη . This tells us that h ε + η ≥ I [0,x+δ εη ] and therefore F m (x + δ εη ) ≤P m (h ε + η) = P m (h ε ) + η < F m (x) + ε + η. From the non-decreasing character of F m [Proposition 3] it then follows that F m (x+) ≤ F m (x +δ εη ) < F m (x)+ε +η. Since this holds for any ε, η > 0, we deduce that F m (x+) ≤ F m (x). The converse inequality follows from the non-decreasing character of F m . We now turn to the second statement. Take
, where the second and fourth equalities hold because D m is countable and the third follows from Lemma 4. On the other hand, a reasoning similar to the one in the first statement allows us to deduce that F m (x−) = F m (x) when x ∈ (0, 1).
The third statement follows from the definition of F m (0−) and F m (0−) and Proposition 3.
For the fourth statement, taking into account Proposition 3, it suffices to show that F m (1−) = F m (1−). The proof of this fact has already been given above as an extra in the proof of statement 2.
The fifth statement follows from the first, Proposition 3 and the right-continuity of F σ m . The first part of the sixth statement is a consequence of the first, second and fourth statements. For the second part, note that F m (0−) = F m (0) = F m (0+) from the first and third statements, so 0 does not belong to D F m . Hence,
Let us now prove the seventh statement. The equivalence between (i) and (ii) follows from the first two statements. On the other hand, the equivalence between (ii) and (iii) follows from the second and the fifth statements.
The equivalence in the eighth statement follows from the first and third statements. The implication is trivial: F σ m is always continuous in 0 because it is right-continuous everywhere.
Finally, the equivalence in the ninth statement follows from the fourth and fifth statements. For the implication, note that we always have F m (1) = F m (1) = 1.
We see that, if m is a sequence satisfying the Hausdorff moment condition, the distribution function F σ m of the unique σ -additive probability P σ m with these moments is equal to the upper distribution function F m . This also allows us to determine F m and F m directly from the moment sequence m. Indeed, it is established in the literature [13, Section VII.3, Eq. (3.11)] that
in all points of (left-)continuity x of F σ m . Since we know that F σ m is right-continuous, this completely determines F σ m , and therefore also F m and F m through Proposition 5. The following example adds further detail to the picture drawn in this proposition. Example 1. Let us consider the moment sequence m given by m k = 1 for k ≥ 0. It satisfies the Hausdorff moment conditions since all non-trivial differences are zero. Observe that the σ -additive probability measure all of whose probability mass is concentrated in 1 is the unique σ -additive probability measure with this moment sequence. As a result, E m ({1}) = 1. It follows from conjugacy that E m ([0, 1)) = 1 − E m ({1}) = 0, and as a consequence F m (1−) = sup t<1 F m (t) = 0. Hence, the inequality in the fourth statement of Proposition 5 may be strict. Moreover, 1 belongs to D m even though F m (1) = F m (1) = 1. Hence, the converse implication in the ninth statement of Proposition 5 need not hold.
Similarly, let us consider the moment sequence m given by m 0 = 1 and m k = 0 for k > 0. It also satisfies the Hausdorff moment condition, and the σ -additive probability measure all of whose probability mass is concentrated in 0 is the unique σ -additive probability measure with this moment sequence. As a consequence, we see that 
Proof. Simply observe that for any
Taking the supremum of the left-hand side of this inequality yields (int(A) ). The equalities involving E m can be proven in a completely similar way, or using conjugacy. Now consider, for any set A its topological interior int(A). Let, for any x ∈ int(A), I(x) be the maximal interval that contains x and is included in int(A). Since int(A) is open, we know that I(x) ∈ T and that it has (strictly) positive length. Moreover, let us define I (A) = {I(x) : x ∈ int(A)} as the collection of all maximal intervals of int(A). All these maximal intervals are furthermore pairwise-disjoint (otherwise they would not be maximal), so they can only be countable in number. Moreover, int(A) = I∈I (A) I, so we see that if we know the values that E m takes on countable unions of disjoint open intervals, we know the value of E m for any event.
The important result in Proposition 9 below tells us that it even suffices to know the values of E m on finite unions of disjoint open intervals. In order to prove this, we first need to establish a couple of simple lemmas. Proof. Consider ε > 0, then it follows from Equation (3) that there is some continuous gamble g ε on [0, 1] satisfying g ε ≤ I B and E m (B) −P m (g ε ) < ε 2 . By Lemma 7, there is some continuous non-negative gamble f ε on [0, 1] satisfying g ε ≤ f ε ≤ I B and therefore, using the monotonicity ofP m , E m (B) −P m ( f ε ) < ε 2 . Let us define f ε,n := f ε I n k=0 B k for any n ≥ 0. The sequence f ε,n , n ≥ 0 satisfies the following properties.
12 By an open interval we shall mean a subinterval of (i) It converges point-wise to f ε : if x ∈ B, there is some n such that x ∈ B n , whence f ε, (x) = f ε (x) for all ≥ n. On the other hand, if x / ∈ B, we have f ε (x) = 0, and then f ε, (x) = f ε (x) = 0 for any ≥ 0.
(ii) It is non-decreasing: f ε,n ≤ f ε,n+1 for any n ≥ 0. (iii) f ε,n is continuous for any n. This follows at once from Lemma 8 if we let f = f ε ,
Applying Dini's Convergence Theorem (see for instance [22, Section 17 .7]), we conclude that the sequence f ε,n , n ≥ 0 converges uniformly to f ε . Since the linear previsionP m is uniformly continuous and monotone, it follows that lim n→∞Pm ( f ε,n ) = sup nP m ( f ε,n ) = P m ( f ε ), and as a consequence there is some n ε ≥ 0 such thatP m ( f ε ) −P m ( f ε,n ) < ε 2 for all n ≥ n ε . Since f ε,n ≤ I n k=0 B k for all n ≥ 0, we deduce from the monotonicity [due to coherence] of E m thatP m ( f ε,n ) = E m ( f ε,n ) ≤ E m ( n k=0 B k ) for all n ≥ 0, and so for all n ≥ n ε we have that
This means that E m (B) = sup n≥0 E m ( n k=0 B k ). We can go still one step further if we recognise that E m is additive on finite unions of disjoint open sets, so that E m is actually 'σ -additive' on countable unions of disjoint open sets. where the last equality follows from the first statement. Now let f be any continuous gamble on [0, 1] dominated by I (x,y) . Then since f (x) ≤ 0 and f (y) ≤ 0, we have for any ε > 0 that f (x) − ε < 0 and f (y) − ε < 0. Since the gamble f − ε is continuous, there is some 0 < δ < y−x 2 such that f (t) − ε ≤ 0 for any t outside the non-empty open interval (x + δ , y − δ ), so f − ε ≤ I (x+δ ,y−δ ) . So we get
where we have used Equation (3), the third statement, the non-decreasing character of 
. Combined with Equation (4), this yields the desired equality.
The first equality in the second statement follows from Proposition 6. The second follows from the fourth statement.
The first part of the fifth statement follows by conjugacy, and the second part from Proposition 6.
The sixth statement follows from the fourth statement and Proposition 6. The seventh statement follows from Proposition 6, and the last statement has been proven in Proposition 3.
In what follows, it will be useful to be able to characterise which intervals I are mintegrable, meaning that E m (I) = E m (I). The following proposition gives a surprisingly simple characterisation: the m-integrability of an interval I is completely determined by whether its endpoints belong to D m . We have said before that whenever there is a linear prevision with a particular sequence of moments m k , there also is a unique σ -additive probability P σ m with these moments. We now see that, although the σ -additive probability will be unique, this will never be the case for probabilities that are only finitely additive. To put it differently, a linear prevision on L ([0, 1]) is never completely determined by its moments. We will comment further on this fact in the Conclusion. 2. Can we say something similar about the values that E m assumes on gambles, and not just events?
We shall answer both questions positively in Theorem 14 further on. But before we can address these issues, we need to prepare ourselves a bit better. In order to answer the first question, it will help us to consider the set of all m-integrable open intervals. By Proposition 12 this is the set 
Note that since x k / ∈ D m for all k, we have F m (x 2k−1 −) = F m (x 2k−1 ), and we could also replace F m by F m or vice versa in this equation.
In order to answer the second question, we point out that there exists, besides Equation (3), another representation of the natural extension E m to gambles, that is more informative, and provides additional insight about its nature. This representation derives from the fact that E m is the natural extension of the linear previsionP m , which is in particular a completely monotone lower prevision. Moreover, the domain C ([0, 1]) ofP m is a linear lattice of gambles on [0, 1] that contains all constant gambles. Hence, we can apply the results mentioned in Section 2 about this type of previsions. Let L m denote the class of m-integrable gambles 
where the first integral is the Choquet integral associated with the restriction of E m to events, and the second and third integrals are Riemann integrals. Proof. Observe thatP m is a completely monotone coherent lower probability defined on a lattice of events O m that contains / 0 and [0, 1]; this is because it is a restriction of the completely monotone and coherent lower prevision E m . Hence, the natural extension ofP m to all events is its inner set functionP m, * , and this inner set function is completely monotone as well. This proves the first statement.
To prove the second statement, first recall thatP m, * is the natural extension ofP m , so it is the smallest coherent lower probability that coincides withP m on O m . Since E m coincides withP m on O m and is coherent, it must therefore dominateP m, * on all events. To prove that, conversely,P m, * dominates E m on events, consider any A ⊆ [0, 1]. Then by definitioñ 
also taking into account thatP m, * is super-additive and monotone [because it is a coherent lower probability, as a restriction of the coherent lower prevision E m ]. This completes the proof of the second statement. The third statement now follows from Theorem 13 and the transitivity of natural extension (see Section 2).
SOME REMARKS ON THE HAUSDORFF LOWER MOMENT PROBLEM
Before ending this paper, we devote some attention to a more general type of 'lower' moment problem. Indeed, it may be interesting to consider the moment problem for some particular types of coherent lower previsions that are not necessarily linear previsions. This means that we consider a sequence m of real numbers, and study under which conditions there is some coherent lower prevision P on L ([0, 1]) with lower moments m k , i.e., satisfying P(p k ) = m k for all k ≥ 0. We should warn the reader here that in the present case the moments will no longer be precise, that is, the upper moments P(p k ) need not be equal to (may strictly dominate) the lower moments P(p k ) = m k .
Of course, if the lower moment sequence m satisfies the Hausdorff moment condition, then we know from Theorem 1 that there is a linear prevision P with this moment sequence, and therefore in particular also a coherent lower prevision. However, the converse is not true, as the following simple counterexample shows.
Example 2. Let P 1 be the linear prevision given by P 1 ({0.5}) = P 1 ({0.9}) = 0.5. Then its first four moments are given by m 1 0 = 1, m 1 1 = 0.7, m 1 2 = 0.53 and m 1 3 = 0.427. Consider on the other hand the linear prevision P 2 determined by P 2 ({0.25}) = P 2 ({1}) = 0.5. Its first four moments are m 2 0 = 1, m 2 1 = 0.625, m 2 2 = 0.53125 and m 2 3 = 0.5078125. Now let P be the lower envelope of {P 1 , P 2 }. This is a coherent lower prevision, and its first four lower moments are m 0 = 1, m 1 = 0.625, m 2 = 0.53 and m 3 = 0.427. To see that there is no linear prevision with these first four moments, it suffices to check that there is no completely monotone sequence starting with {m 0 , m 1 , m 2 , m 3 }. This follows at once if we note that
Hence, the moment problem for coherent lower previsions is more general than the one for linear previsions. It is therefore quite remarkable that both problems are equivalent when we consider the additional assumption of 2-monotonicity. Proof. The 'if' part is trivial, since any linear prevision is in particular a 2-monotone coherent lower prevision. To prove the 'only if' part, assume that P is coherent, 2-monotone and satisfies P(p k ) = m k for all k. We already know from coherence that m 0 = P(p 0 ) = P(1) = 1. It therefore remains to show that m is completely monotone. To this end, we first show that given k 1 , k 2 ≥ 0, there is some linear prevision Q in M (P) such that Q(p k ) = P(p k ) = m k for all k 1 ≤ k ≤ k 1 +k 2 . Indeed, the gambles in p k : k 1 ≤ k ≤ k 1 + k 2 are all comonotone with each other. Moreover, since a coherent 2-monotone lower prevision is also comonotone additive, we get P(
On the other hand, since P is coherent, there is some linear prevision Q in M (P) such that P(
where the second equality follows from the additivity of Q. Now each of the terms Q(p k ) in the second sum dominates the corresponding term P(p k ) in the first sum, and since the sums are equal, so are all the corresponding terms: Q(p k ) = P(p k ) = m k , which proves our claim. Now, since Q is a linear prevision, its moments Q(p k ) must satisfy the Hausdorff moment condition because of Theorem 1. Hence in particular (−1) k 2 ∆ k 2 Q(p k 1 ) ≥ 0. But since in this difference there only appear moments Q(p k ) with k 1 ≤ k ≤ k 1 + k 2 , it follows from the considerations above that (−1) k 2 ∆ k 2 m k 1 ≥ 0. Since we can do this for any k 1 , k 2 ≥ 0, we deduce that the moment sequence m is completely monotone.
CONCLUSION
The sequence of moments of a σ -additive probability measure P σ on the Borel sets of [0, 1] completely determines this measure: we cannot find two different σ -additive probabilities with the same sequence of moments. We have shown in this paper that this is not the case when we consider probabilities which are merely finitely additive: indeed, the sequence of moments of a finitely additive probability P will be shared by an infinity of different finitely additive probabilities. Among their restrictions to the Borel sets of [0, 1], only one will be σ -additive, namely P σ .
We have also proven that this class of finitely additive probabilities on [0, 1] with a given sequence of moments is characterised in particular by the values they take on events, or, even more precisely, by the values they take on integrable open intervals. The integrability of these intervals can be easily determined by looking at the discontinuity points of the associated upper and lower distribution functions, or equivalently, of F σ .
The fact that the lower and upper envelopes of the finitely additive probabilities with a given sequence of moments are respectively completely monotone and completely alternating allow us to relate this set of linear previsions to specific types of (lower and upper) integrals: for instance, the lower and upper previsions it induces are the Choquet integrals with respect to their restrictions to events.
There is an interesting connection between our results and de Finetti's [9] work on exchangeable sequences. In fact, his Representation Theorem, stripped to its bare essentials, 13 states that given an exchangeable sequence of events, there is a representing positive linear functional R (i.e., linear or coherent prevision) on the set V ([0, 1]) of polynomial gambles on [0, 1] (actually, on the set of Bernstein basis polynomials B n,p ) such that the probability of p successes in n observations is P(S n = p) = R(B n,p ) for all natural numbers n and 0 ≤ p ≤ n. Of course, the linear prevision R is completely determined by its raw moments m n = R(B n,0 ), and it can be extended to a unique linear prevision on the set C ([0, 1]) of continuous gambles on [0, 1]. In later discussions of this result, several authors (see, for instance, [13; 16; 17] ) use the F. Riesz representation theorem in some form to extend this linear prevision uniquely to a σ -additive probability measure on the Borel sets of [0, 1], which allows them to claim that exchangeability is equivalent to being conditionally independent and identically distributed (see for instance [17, Theorem 1.1]), and to use this extension to prove various limit theorems (such as the strong law of large numbers, or the Hewitt-Savage zero-one law). Of course, de Finetti would have strongly disagreed with this claim, because he refused to consider σ -additivity as normative, or as anything more than a mathematical convenience.
14 This is why the (weak, but especially the strong) limit laws he proves for exchangeable sequences, are expressed only in finitary terms, using 'strong convergence' rather than 'almost sure convergence'. 15 As a consequence, the prevision of any gamble h that is not m-integrable (and therefore a fortiori discontinuous) on [0, 1] is essentially undetermined, and the most we can say, in accordance with de Finetti's Fundamental Theorem of Probability, is that it can assume any value between E m (h) and E m (h). In this sense, if we let go of the σ -additivity requirement, the natural extension E m is actually the representing lower prevision.
